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Abstract
We address the important practical issue of understanding, predicting
and eventually controlling catastrophic endogenous changes in a collective.
Such large internal changes arise as macroscopic manifestations of the
microscopic dynamics, and their presence can be regarded as one of the
defining features of an evolving complex system. We consider the specific
case of a multi-agent system related to the El Farol bar model, and show
explicitly how the information concerning such large macroscopic changes
becomes encoded in the microscopic dynamics. Our findings suggest that
these large endogenous changes can be avoided either by pre-design of
the collective machinery itself, or in the post-design stage via continual
monitoring and occasional ‘vaccinations’.
A contribution to the Workshop on Collectives and the Design of Complex
Systems, organized by David Wolpert and Kagan Tumer, at NASA Ames
Research Center, CA, August (2002).
1 Introduction
Understanding the relationship between the overall macroscopic performance of
a collective, and its design at the microscopic level, is a high priority for the
collectives field (see, for example, Ref. [29]). Typically such performance can be
measured in terms of a macroscopic variable of the system which fluctuates in
time: for example the level of wastage of a global resource. An example which
can be seen in other Chapters of this book, is the discussion of the fluctuations
in attendance in the El Farol bar game and related multi-agent models such as
the Minority Game. In those cases, one is particularly interested in understand-
ing how to minimize the typical size of such fluctuations and hence ‘optimize’
performance by minimizing the average wastage. In practice, however, typical
optimization schemes which focus on minimizing the variance of some global
quantity may not be the most relevant. Biology is a wonderful example of a
non-optimal system, yet one which does a fantastic job of avoiding catastrophic
large changes. The human body, for example, has a complex network of feedback
loops set in place in order to ‘survive’. While very few of us exist at our peak
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level, and even fewer of us hold world records in athletics, we do a pretty good
job of coping with everything our changing bodies and changing environment
can throw at us. Moreover, the human system can self-manage this difficult
situation for up to 100 years, an unimaginable feat for any computer-based
system. In short, we may not be optimal in the sense of minimizing wastage,
yet our system can handle sudden changes in the environment (i.e. exogenous
changes) and also typically manages to resist the tendency to self-generate large
unexpected (endogenous) changes or ‘system crashes’.
Large unexpected changes, or so-called extreme events, happen infrequently,
yet tend to dictate the long-term dynamical behaviour of real-world systems
in disciplines as diverse as biology and economics, through to ecology and evo-
lution. Their consequences are often catastrophic – for example, the sudden
jamming of traffic in an information system or on a highway; a fatal change
within the human immune system; so-called punctuated equilibria in evolution
leading to the sudden extinction of entire species; and crashes in a financial
market [2, 18, 24]. The ability to generate large internal, endogenous changes is
a defining characteristic of complex systems, and arguably of Nature and Life
itself since it leads to evolution through innovation. Thinking through to the
management of real-world complex systems and collectives, and in particular
the risk associated with such catastrophic changes, one wonders whether these
large events could eventually be controlled, or even avoided altogether?
Here we take the first few steps in the direction of ‘risk-management’ in
collectives. We consider the specific problem of a complex adaptive multi-
agent population, competing for some limited resource. The system is a variant
of Arthur’s famous El Farol bar model [1], and exhibits large, self-generated
changes. We show that information about the large endogenous changes be-
comes encoded in the system ahead of the large change itself. The implication
is that with a reasonable amount of information, the large change would cease
to be a ‘surprise’. The present work therefore has relevance to both the forward
and reverse problem in collectives. In ‘pre-design’ collectives – i.e. collectives in
which the individual components can be tailor-made to have certain fixed prop-
erties – such knowledge could help in the design of ‘safe’ agents whose collective
behavior is such that large changes are avoided altogether. In ‘post-design’ col-
lectives – i.e. collectives for which a designer has no control over the properties of
the individual components – one could nevertheless hope to control such large
changes in order to minimize the potential damage. In particular, one could
imagine some form of soft monitoring, whereby an external regulator monitored
the system output, detected certain precursors suggesting a dangerous build-up
to a large change, then intervened to divert it. Going further, we have recently
shown [12] that such systems can actually be ‘vaccinated’ ahead of such large
changes thereby affording the system a degree of temporary immunity.
The science of complex systems, as befits its name, lacks a simple defini-
tion [25, 30]. It has been used to refer to systems that are intermediate between
perfect order and perfect disorder; or even as a simple restatement of the cliche´
that the behaviour of some systems as a whole can be more than the sum of
their parts. Formal definitions of complexity do exist in the computational and
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information sciences, but apply to specific systems [3]. Here we focus on systems
where both the properties of the individual components and the nature of their
interactions are reasonably well understood. The constituents themselves can
be rather simple, and the relation between any two may also be well understood,
yet the collective behavior of the ensemble still manages to escape any simple
explanation. A simple example which captures the idea of (co-)evolution and
bounded rationality is Arthur’s El Farol bar problem [1]. At its most basic level,
this is an example of a game involving a fixed population of players (agents)
Ntot competing for a limited resource L. No more than L < Ntot agents can
win at each timestep. The agents are adaptive and try to predict the next
winning outcome, which is determined only by their own choices. Each agent
is equipped with a number of strategies from which to choose, and can do so
adaptively based on its present environment. Recent experiments confirm that
humans indeed possess such different strategies, despite being faced with the
same history [13]. In short, the El Farol bar problem contains the following key
‘complex’ elements:
• A population of heterogeneous agents with bounded rationality.
• Agents who use history-based strategies upon which they base their ac-
tions.
• A method of aggregating agent’s behaviour into a global outcome, which
introduces feedback into the system.
Our study focuses on a generic multi-agent system, based on the El Farol
bar problem, which has already been shown to reproduce statistical and dy-
namical features similar to those of a real-world complex adaptive system: a
financial market. (See www.unifr.ch/econophysics for a detailed account of the
extent to which financial markets represent complex systems, and their associ-
ated statistical and dynamical properties). Our model also exhibits the crucial
feature of seemingly spontaneous large changes of variable duration [20, 21]. Al-
though our study is therefore specific to a particular model, we believe that any
multi-agent model which shares the above elements would benefit from the tech-
niques described in this chapter. Recently the concept of an agent has become
increasingly important in both artificial intelligence and mainstream computer
science [28]. In contrast to the agents considered within El Farol-like complex
systems as in this Chapter, the agents in these other fields are typically more
sophisticated and are often utilized to perform specific tasks in a wide range of
different areas, e.g. e-commerce, classification, information retrieval and man-
agement of networks [17, 8]. By studying complex systems involving more basic
agents, but which retain the ability to react to their present environment, we
aim to develop approaches that may be useful in more complicated collectives
comprising richer components.
The Chapter is arranged as follows. In §2 we introduce our generic complex
system and in §3 demonstrate its ability to generate time-series which include
occasional large movements. In §4 we investigate the game dynamics during
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these large changes and determine what is occurring microscopically within the
model system. In §4.1 we introduce a method of understanding when a large
change is possible within the system, and obtain approximate expressions for
its duration in §4.2. This leads to an understanding of how such large changes
may be avoided.
2 The Grand Canonical Bar Game
We consider a generic complex system in which a population of Ntot heteroge-
neous agents with limited capabilities and information repeatedly compete for
a limited global resource. The model is a generalization of Arthur’s bar model
where agents will only take part, or play, if they are sufficiently confident of the
strategies they hold. A strategy is a forecasting rule that generates a prediction
of the next winning outcome based on knowledge of the recent history of winning
choices. This is the Grand Canonical Bar Game (GCBG),1 It captures some of
the key behavioural phenomena that are important in collectives/complex sys-
tems; those of competition, frustration and adaptability. It is also a ‘minimal’
system of only few parameters.
The GCBG comprises a number of agentsNtot who repeatedly decide whether
to enter a game where the choices are option A or B. Because of the limited global
resource, only agents who are sufficiently confident of winning will participate at
each timestep. The outcome at each timestep represents the winning decision,
A or B. The agents are adaptive in their strategy choices, but not evolutionary;
there is no discovery of new strategies by the agents. A maximum of L(t) agents
can win at each timestep. Changing L(t) affects the system’s quasi-equilibrium;
hence L(t) can be used to mimic the changing external environment. In the
limit that L(t) is time-independent, and all agents are forced to play at each
timestep, our model reverts to Arthur’s El Farol bar model. A schematic of
the game structure is shown in Figure 1, clearly indicating the feedback present
within the system. The method of encoding the outcomes in the game via a
binary alphabet, and the associated strategy space, were introduced by Challet
and Zhang [5]. However the GCBG differs from the basic Minority Game in its
use of an external resource level, and a variable number of participating agents
per timestep as a result of the finite confidence level. The agents are of limited
yet similar capabilities. Each agent is assigned a ‘brain-size’m; this is the length
of the past history bit-string that an agent can use when making its next deci-
sion. A common bit-string of the m most recent outcomes is made available to
the agents at each timestep. This is the only information they can use to decide
which option to choose in subsequent timesteps. Each agent randomly picks q
strategies at the beginning of the game, with repetitions allowed. A strategy
uses information from the historical record of winning options to generate a
prediction [5]. After each turn, the agent assigns one (virtual) point to each
of his strategies which would have predicted the correct outcome, and minus
1Grand Canonical is a term used in statistical physics to describe a system with a variable
number of particles.
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Figure 1: Schematic of game structure.
one for an incorrect prediction. The resulting time-series appears ‘random’ yet
is non-Markovian, with subtle temporal correlations which put it beyond any
random-walk based description. Multi-agent games such as the present GCBG
may be simulated on a computer, but can also be expressed in analytic form.
In the next section we introduce some notation used in the remainder of this
chapter.
2.1 Notation
A subset of the agent population, who are sufficiently confident of winning, are
active at each timestep. At each timestep t we denote the number of agents
choosing option A as NA(t) and the number choosing B as NB(t). If L(t) −
NA(t) > 0 the winning decision is A and vice-versa. The winning decision is
thus given by
w(t) = sgn [L(t)−NA(t)] ,
where sgn[x] is the sign function defined by
sgn[x] =


−1 for x < 0,
0 for x = 0,
1 for x > 0.
We denote by w(t) the winning option at time t, where a value of 1⇒ option A,
and −1 ⇒ option B. We frequently have to represent the two possible choices,
A or B, in numerical form, and we use the encoding that 1 always implies option
A and −1 implies option B. If w(t) = 0, indicating no clear winning option, this
value is replaced with a random coin toss.
The ‘excess demand’ D(t) = NA(t) −NB(t) (which mimics price-change in
a market) and number V (t) = NA(t) + NB(t) of active agents (which mimics
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Figure 2: Typical time-evolution of the complex adaptive system for differing
values of the global resource level: (a) L = 0.45V (t), (b) L = 0.5V (t), and (c)
L = 0.55V (t). In each case, the thick line P (t) represents the cumulative excess
demand. For L greater (less) than 0.5Ntot, P (t) has an upward (downward)
trend. (d) Corresponding qq-plot for L = 0.55V (t) series illustrating the pres-
ence of power-law like fat tails. The result for a normal distribution would be a
diagonal line, as indicated.
volume) represent output variables. These two quantities fluctuate with time,
and can be combined to construct other global quantities of interest for the
complex system studied. We define the cumulative excess demand as P (t).
In the context of a financial market, this can be regarded as a pseudo-price.
Typically we use the example of a financial market, but the excess demand can
be interpreteted in many different circumstances, e.g. as a measure of resource
utilization within a system. If we define L(t) = φV (t), where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, then
only a fraction φ of the active population can win. By varying the value of φ,
it is possible to change the equilibrium value of D(t), see Figure 2.
The only global information available to the agents is a common bit-string
‘memory’ of the m most recent outcomes. Consider m = 2; the P = 2m =
4 possible history bit-strings are AA, AB, BA and BB, with the right-most
letter representing the winning choice at the last timestep. The history, or
equivalently, the global information available to the agents, can be represented
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in decimal form µ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , P − 1}:
µ(t) =
m∑
i=1
2i−1 [w(t − i) + 1] .
The global information µ(t) is updated by dropping the first bit and concate-
nating the latest outcome to the end of the string.
At the beginning of the game, each agent randomly picks q (> 1) strategies,
making the agents heterogeneous in their strategy sets.2 This initial strategy
assignment is fixed from the outset of each simulation and provides a systematic
disorder which is built into each run. This is referred to as the quenched disorder
present in the game. An agent decides which option to choose at a given time
step based on the prediction of a strategy, which consists of a response, aµ(t) ∈
{−1, 1} to the global information µ(t). For its current play, an agent chooses
its strategy that would have performed best over the history of the game until
that time, i.e. has the most virtual points.
Agents have a time horizon T over which virtual points are collected and
a threshold probability level τ which mimics a ‘confidence’. Only strategies
having ≥ r points are used, where
r = T (2τ − 1).
We call these active strategies. Agents with no active strategies within their
individual set of q strategies do not play at that timestep and become temporar-
ily inactive. Agents with one or more active strategies play the one with the
highest virtual point score; any ties between active strategies are resolved using
a coin-toss. If an agent’s threshold to play is low, we would expect the agent
to play a large proportion of the time as their best strategy will have invariably
scored higher than this threshold. Conversely, for high τ , the agent will hardly
play at all. The coin-tosses used to resolve ties in decisions (i.e. NA = NB)
and active-strategy scores, inject stochasticity into the game’s evolution. The
implementation of the strategies is discussed in §2.2.
After each turn, agents update the scores of their strategies with the reward
function
χ[NA(t), L(t)] = sgn [NA(t)− L(t)] , (1)
namely +1 for choosing the correct/winning outcome, and −1 for choosing the
incorrect outcome. The virtual points for strategy R are updated via
SR(t) =
t−1∑
i=t−T
a
µ(i)
R χ
[
NA(i), L(i)
]
,
2Agents are only adaptive if they have more than one strategy to play with; for q = 1 the
game has a trivial periodic structure.
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where a
µ(t)
R is the response of strategy R to global information µ(t), and the
summation is taken over a rolling window of fixed length T .3 To start the sim-
ulation, we set the initial strategy scores to be zero: SR(0) = 0. Because of the
feedback in the game, any particular strategy’s success is short-lived. If all the
agents begin to use similar strategies, and hence make the same decision, such
a strategy ceases to be profitable and is subsequently dropped. This encourages
heterogeneity amongst the agent population.
The demand D(t) and volume V (t), which can be identified as the output
from the model system, are given by
D(t) = n(t) ·
(
a
µ(t)H
[
S(t)− r
])
=
Q∑
R=1
nR(t)a
µ(t)
R H
[
SR(t)− r
]
, (2a)
V (t) = n(t) · H
[
S(t)− r
]
=
Q∑
R=1
nR(t)H
[
SR(t)− r
]
. (2b)
where nR(t) represents the number of agents playing strategy R at timestep t.
The demand D(t) is made up of two groups of agents at each timestep:
DD(t) agents who act in a deterministic manner, i.e. do not require a coin toss
to decide which choice to make - this is because they either have one strategy
that is better than their others, or because their highest-scoring strategies are
tied but give the same response to the history µ(t), and DU (t) agents that act
in an ‘undecided’ way, i.e. they require the toss of a coin to decide which choice
to make - this is because they have two (or more) highest-scoring tied strategies
which give different responses at that turn of the game. Inactive agents do not
contribute to the demand. Hence we can rewrite (2a) as
D(t) = DD(t) +DU (t). (3)
Without the stochastic influence of the undecided agents the game will tend
to exhibit group, or cyclic behaviour, where the game eventually traces out a
deterministic path. The period of this cyclic behaviour is dependent on the
quenched disorder present in the simulation, and could be very long.
The number of agents holding a particular combination of strategies can also
be expressed as a q-dimensional tensor Ω [11], where the entry ΩR1,R2,... repre-
sents the number of agents holding strategies {R1, R2, . . .}. This quenched dis-
order is fixed at the beginning of the game. It is useful to construct a symmetric
3It is also possible to construct an exponentially weighted window of characteristic length
T , with a decay parameter λ = 1− 1/T . The strategy score updating equation (4) becomes
S(t + 1) = aµ(t)w(t) + λS(t).
This has the advantage of removing the hard cut off from the rolling window (a Fourier
transform of the demand can show the effect of this periodicity in the time series), and is a
rapid recursive calculation. But strategy scores are no longer integers, and the probability of
a strategy score tie is now very low. Since one source of stochasticity has now been effectively
removed, there must be occasional periods of inactivity to inject stochasticity which helps to
prevent group, or cyclic, behaviour when the game traces out a deterministic path.
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configurationΨ in the sense that ΨR1,R2,... = Ψp{R1,R2,...} where p{R1, R2, . . .}
is any permutation of the strategies R1, R2, . . .; for q = 2 we let Ψ = 12 (Ω+Ω
T )
. Elements ΨR,R′ enumerate the number of agents holding both strategy R and
R′. We focus on q = 2 strategies per agent, although the formalism can be
generalised. At timestep t, DD(t) can now be expressed as
DD(t) =
Q∑
R=1
a
µ(t)
R H[SR(t)− r]
Q∑
R′=1
(1 + sgn [SR(t)− SR′(t)]) ΨR,R′ .
The number of undecided agents NU is given by
NU (t) =
∑
R,R′
H[SR(t)− r]δ(SR(t)− SR′(t))[1 − δ(a
µ(t)
R − a
µ(t)
R′ )]ΨR,R′
and hence the demand of the undecided agents DU (t) is distributed binomially:
DU (t) = 2 Bin
(
NU (t),
1
2
)
−NU (t)
where Bin(n, p) is a sample from a binomial distribution of n trials with prob-
ability of success p.
2.2 The strategy space
The strategy space analysis in the Section was inspired by the work of Challet
and Zhang [5, 6]. A strategy consists of a response, aµ ∈ {−1, 1} to each possible
bit-string µ, aµ = 1 ⇒ option A, and aµ = −1 ⇒ option B. Consider m = 2,
each strategy can be represented by a string of P = 4 bits [i j k l] with
i, j, k, l = −1 or +1 corresponding to the decisions based on the histories AA,
AB, BA and BB respectively. For example, strategy [-1 -1 -1 -1] corresponds
to deciding to pick option B irrespective of the m = 2 bit-string. [1 1 1 1]
corresponds to deciding to pick option A irrespective of the m = 2 bitstring.
[1 -1 1 -1] corresponds to deciding to pick option A given the histories AA or
BA, and pick option B given the histories AB or BB. A subset of strategies can
further be classed as one of the following:
• anti-correlated : for example, any two agents using the strategies [-1 -1 -1 -1]
and [1 1 1 1] would take the opposite action irrespective of the sequence
of previous outcomes. Hence one agent will always do the opposite of the
other agent, and their net effect on the excess demand D(t) will be zero.
• un-correlated : for example, any two agents using the strategies [-1 -1 -1 -1]
and [1 -1 1 -1] would take the opposite action for two of the four histo-
ries, and take the same action for the remaining two histories. Assuming
that the m = 2 histories occur equally often, the actions of the two agents
will be uncorrelated on average
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Figure 3: Stylistic example of the m = 2 strategy space.
A convenient measure of the distance of any two strategies is the relative Ham-
ming distance, defined as the number of bits that need to be changed in go-
ing from one strategy to another. For example, the Hamming distance be-
tween [-1 -1 -1 -1] and [1 1 1 1] is 4, while the Hamming distance between
[-1 -1 -1 -1] and [1 -1 1 -1] is just 2.
The collection of all possible strategies (and their associated virtual points)
is hereafter referred to as the strategy space, see e.g. Figure 3. This object can
be thought of as a common property of the game itself, being updated centrally
after each timestep. Each individual agent monitors only a fixed subset q of the
Q possible strategies (with the small caveat that a repeated strategy choice is
possible). After each turn, an agent assigns one (virtual) point to each of its
strategies which would have predicted the correct outcome. The virtual points
for each strategy can be represented by the strategy score vector S(t), and are
given by
S(t) =
t−1∑
i=t−T
a
µ(i)χ
[
NA(i), L(i)
]
(4)
In total, there are Q = 2P possible strategies which define the decisions in re-
sponse to all possiblem history bit-strings. This is referred to as the full strategy
space (FSS). However, the principal features of the system are reproduced in
a smaller reduced strategy space (RSS) of Q = 2m+1 strategies wherein any
two strategies are either un-correlated or anti-correlated [6], i.e. separated by a
Hamming distance of either 2m or 2m−1. The full and reduced strategy space a
form = 2 has been reproduced in Figure 4. Each row represents a strategy, each
column is assigned to a particular history, giving the strategy space a dimension
of P ×Q. The prediction of strategy R to information µ is aµR and corresponds
to the (R, µ) element of a. The ordering of the rows in unimportant.
Within the strategy space, each strategy R has an anticorrelated strategy
R¯. We note that the anticorrelated strategies are effectively redundant, as their
predictions and strategy scores can be recovered from their anticorrelated pair:
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a =


−1 −1 −1 −1
−1 −1 −1 1
−1 −1 1 −1
−1 −1 1 1
−1 1 −1 −1
−1 1 −1 1
−1 1 1 −1
−1 1 1 1
1 −1 −1 −1
1 −1 −1 1
1 −1 1 −1
1 −1 1 1
1 1 −1 −1
1 1 −1 1
1 1 1 −1
1 1 1 1


a =


−1 −1 −1 −1
−1 1 −1 1
1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 −1 1
1 1 1 1
1 −1 1 −1
−1 −1 1 1
−1 1 1 −1


Figure 4: Example of an m = 2 strategy space. The full strategy space contain-
ing 16 strategies is reproduced on the left, with the reduced strategy space of 8
strategies on the right.
a
µ
R¯
= −aµR, (5a)
SR¯(t) = −SR(t). (5b)
Equation (5a) is true by definition, i.e. a strategy and its anticorrelated pair
always give the opposite prediction. However (5b) requires a symmetric scoring
rule to be used, which is satisfied by (1). Thus we can reproduce the dynamics
using a space of just P strategies, in which agents choose both a strategy and
whether to agree or disagree with its prediction. Reducing the size of the strat-
egy space is advantageous as it reduces memory requirements and increases the
speed of the simulation. For a more detailed description of how to implement
such a system, see [22].
3 Demonstration of large changes
A ubiquitous feature of complex systems is that large changes, or ‘extreme
events’, arise far more often than would be expected if the individual agents
acted independently. We frequently refer to crashes, but are interested in large
moves in either direction. With a suitable choice of parameters the GCBG is
able to generate time series which include occasional large movements, see e.g.
Figure 5. The game can be broadly classified into three regimes:
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Figure 5: Example of a time series exhibiting large changes. The model param-
eters were Ntot = 101, T = 60, τ = 0.53, m = 3 and q = 2.
1. The number of strategies in play is much greater than the total available:
groups of traders will play using the same strategy and therefore crowds
should dominate the game [19].
2. The number of strategies in play is much less than the total available:
grouping behaviour is therefore minimal.
3. The number of strategies in play is comparable to the total number avail-
able.
We focus on the third regime, since this yields seemingly random dynamics with
occasional large movements.
Large changes seem to exhibit a wide range of possible durations and mag-
nitudes making them difficult to capture using traditional statistical techniques
based on one or two-point probability distributions. A common feature, how-
ever, is an obvious trend (i.e. to the eye) in one direction over a reasonably short
time window: we use this as a working definition of a large change. (In fact, all
the large changes discussed here represent > 3σ events.) In both our model and
the real-world system, these large changes arise more frequently than would be
expected from a random-walk model [18].
In §3.1 we consider the distribution of the excess demand created by our
generic system, and perform a simple analysis to discuss the statistics of extreme
events. To determine whether large movements occur due to a single random
event, we examine the stochastic influence present within the model in §3.2
and find that they arise through a global cooperation occurring over the whole
system.
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3.1 Tail estimation
Traditional parametric statistical methods are ill-suited for dealing with extreme
events, which have little historical data associated with them. Provided the dis-
tribution has a finite variance and the increments are independent, the Central
Limit Theorem will apply near the centre of the distribution, but does not tell
us anything about the tails [4].4 In recent years extreme value theory (EVT), a
branch of probability theory which focuses explicitly on extreme outcomes, has
received increasing attention [10]. EVT considers the distribution of extreme
returns rather than the distribution of all returns. It can be shown that the lim-
iting distribution of extreme returns observed over a long time-period is largely
independent of the distribution of returns itself. The upper tail of a fat-tailed
cumulative distribution function F behaves asymptotically like the tail of the
Pareto distribution given by 1 − F (x) ≈ cx−α, for c > 0, α > 0 and x ≥ C,
where C is a threshold above which the assumed algebraic form is valid, and c
is a normalising constant. The tail index α determines the heaviness of the tail
of a distribution and plays a key role in tail-related risk measures, representing
the maximal order of finite moments. Only the first k moments, where k < α,
are bounded. The greater the tail index, the ‘fatter’ the tail, and the greater
the incidence of extreme events.
An important issue in the study of fat-tailed distributions is the estimation of
the tail index α. There are a number of methods to estimate the tail index, some
using asymptotic results from EVT, from which values can be estimated using
maximum likelihood techniques. However the Hill estimator is commonly used,
as it is suitable for tail estimation of fat-tailed distributions and is relatively
easy to implement [14]. Consider a sample X1, X2, . . . , Xn of n observations
drawn from a stationary iid process, and let X(1) ≥ X(2) ≥ . . . ≥ X(n) be the
descending order statistics. The Hill estimator is based on the difference between
the mth largest observation and the average of the m largest observations:
ξˆm =
1
m
m∑
i=1
logX(i) − logX(m)
where ξ = 1/α is the shape parameter and m is the number of order statistics
used in the tail estimation. The appropriate choice of value m is a non-trivial
problem, since this requires us to decide where the tail begins. There is a tradeoff
between the bias and variance of the estimator in choosing m. If we choose a
large value ofm, the number of order statistics used increases and the variance of
the estimator will decrease. However, choosing a high m also introduces some
observations from the centre of the distribution and the estimation becomes
biased. But if it is too small, the estimate will be based on a just a few of
the largest observations and the estimator will lack precision. Several methods
for the determination of an optimal sample fraction for the Hill estimator have
4The speed at which the distribution will converge to a Gaussian is given by the Berry-
Esseen theorem; a finite second moment ensures Gaussian behaviour, and the speed of con-
vergence is controlled by the size of the third moment of |x| [26].
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Figure 6: Hill-plot with a 0.95 confidence interval. The estimated value of the
shape parameter ξ is plotted against the number of upper order statistics m
used in the estimation. A value of ξ is selected from the plot where the shape
parameter is fairly stable
been proposed [7, 9]. In Figure 6 a Hill plot is constructed from the simulation
data used to create Fig. 5. A threshold is selected from the plot where the
shape parameter is fairly stable, giving an estimate of the tail index α ≈ 3.7.
To obtain the most accurate tail estimate, a combination of several techniques
should be considered.
3.2 The effect of stochasticity
To investigate the stochastic influence due to the effect of coin tosses, we have
studied their occurrence during the simulation. We define two types of coin
toss: type (i), which occurs when an agent has a tie between active strategy
options which predict differing outcomes, and type (ii), which occurs when the
number of agents choosing option A is equal to the number choosing option
B. The main conclusion is that there is no single-coin toss that immediately
causes a large change within the system. and The large movements observed
as arising endogenously in the system, result from the organisation of temporal
and spatial (i.e. strategy space) correlations. In common with other complex
adaptive systems, this organisation does not arise in general from a nucleation
phase diffusing across the system, e.g. it cannot be traced to a particular coin-
toss by a particular agent which triggers the “avalanche”. Rather, it results from
a progressive and more global cooperation occurring over the whole system via
repetitive interactions [27].
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Figure 7: Dynamical behaviour of the global information is described by tran-
sitions on the de Bruijn graph. Graph for population of m = 3 agents. Blue
transitions represent positive demand D, red transitions represent negative de-
mand, with each transition incurring an increment to the score vector S.
4 A study of extreme events
In this section we consider the generic complex system introduced in §2 in
which a population of Ntot heterogeneous agents with limited capabilities and
information, repeatedly compete for a limited global resource. We focus on
extreme events which are endogenous (i.e. internally-produced by the agents
themselves) and provide a microscopic understanding as to their build-up and
likely duration.
4.1 Nodal weight decomposition
The dynamics of the game history can be usefully represented on a directed
de Bruijn graph [23]. This is a graph whose nodes are sequences of symbols
from some alphabet, and whose edges represent possible transitions between
these nodes. It has numerous interesting properties and is frequently discussed
in the context of parallel algorithms and communications networks. This is an
effective method of representing the evolution of the system, and in Figure 7 we
plot the de Bruijn graph for an m = 3 game.
Large changes occur when connected nodes become persistent and the game
makes successive moves in the same direction. Only nodes 0 and 7 can exhibit
perfect nodal persistence, where an allowed transition can return the system to
exactly the same node. This is the simplest type of large change, e.g. µ(t) =
0, 0, 0, 0, . . ., where all successive price changes are in the same direction. We call
this a ‘fixed-node crash’ (or rally). There are many other possibilities reflecting
the wide range of forms and durations that a large change can undertake. For
example, on the m = 3 de Bruijn graph in Fig. 7 the cycle µ = 0, 0, 1, 2, 4, 0, . . .
has four out of the five transitions producing price-changes of the same sign
(it is persistent on nodes 1, 2, 4 and antipersistent on node 0). We call this a
‘cyclic-node crash’. Stable behaviour occurs on a path where all transitions are
equally visited, e.g. µ(t) = 0, 0, 1, 3, 6, 5, 3, 7, 7, 6, 4, 1, 2, 5, 4, . . ..
To identify moments when large changes occur, we need to recognise when
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history nodes are likely to become persistent. Whether a node is persistant or
not will depend on the action of the agents at that timestep, which is determined
by the predictions of the strategies they hold. If the majority of active strategies
generate a prediction of the same outcome, then the demand at that timestep
is likely to continue in that direction. Thus a suitable condition for a large
movement is when there is a concensus of opinion regarding the next outcome
amongst the active strategies. This occurs when the pattern of active strategies
within the strategy space matches up with the pattern of stratgy predictions
for a history node µ, see Figure 8. The strategy predictions will depend on
the global information µ(t), and the distribution of active strategies depends
on the strategy score vector S(t). At each timestep S(t) is updated according
to whether a strategy predicted the winning outcome w(t); the incremental
strategy score is given by a column of the strategy matrix a determined by µ(t).
In total there are P orthogonal increment vectors aµ, one for each value of µ.
We can express the strategy score (4) as
S(t) = c0a
0 + c1a
1 + . . .+ cP−1a
P−1 =
P−1∑
j=0
cja
j , (6)
where cj represents the nodal weight for history node µ = j. The nodal weights
represent the number of negative return transitions from node µ minus the
number of positive return transitions, in the time window t − T → t − 1. The
values of these nodal weights are important in identifying periods in which large
changes can occur. If the value of a nodal weight is near zero, this implies that
the number of active strategies predicting outcome A will be similar to the
number predicting outcome B when that node is reached. The excess demand
will then depend on the quenched disorder and the undecided agents, but is
likely to be small. Conversely, if the value of a nodal weight is significantly
different from zero, this indicates a bias in the strategy space, i.e. the same
pattern is evident in the active strategies and the strategy predictions. When
the game trajectory hits this node, the majority of active strategies will predict
the same outcome, and there will be a consensus amongst the agents. This is
likely to lead to a large excess demand, and therefore a large change. Thus
high absolute nodal weight implies persistence in transitions from that node,
i.e. persistence in D|µ.
The mean of the strategy scores predicting an A or B at node µ are linked
to their nodal weight:
E
[
SR∋aµ
R
=1(t)
]
= cµ(t), (7a)
E
[
SR∋aµ
R
=−1(t)
]
= −cµ(t). (7b)
This symmetry occurs because each strategy has an anticorrelated strategy
present in the strategy space.
The nodal weight decomposition provides a succinct method of describing
the state of the strategy space. We are concerned with high nodal weights on
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Figure 8: Two different configurations of the strategy space for µ(t) = 0. The
columns represent: R – strategy index; Active – where ‘1’ represents an active
strategy and ‘0’ an inactive strategy, i.e.H[SR(t)−r]; Prediction – the prediction
of the strategy, which is given by a0R. In (a) there is no consensus in the
predictions of the active strategies. The active strategies do not share the same
pattern as a0. In (b) there is a consensus of opinion. All the active strategies
predict option A since the pattern of active strategies is similar to the pattern
of strategy predictions.
game cycles that can become persistent. When a nodal weight value becomes
large, this is a warning sign that the system is in a suitable state to undergo
a large change. Figure 9 illustrates a large change which starts as a fixed-node
crash, and then subsequently becomes a cyclic-node crash.
4.2 Estimating the crash length
We are interested in the dynamics of large changes, and use a simplified version
of the system to obtain an analytic expression for the expected crash length. Ref-
erence [15] showed that the GCBG can be usefully described as a stochastically
disturbed deterministic system. As stated in (3), the demand can be divided
into contributions arising from agents acting on a definite strategy DD(t), and
that from the undecided agents DU . The average contribution of the undecided
agents to the net demand will be zero, i.e. E[DU (t)] = 0. Averaging over our
model’s stochasticity in this way yields a description of the game’s deterministic
dynamics. By examining these dynamics, we can determine when a large-change
is likely. For q = 2 the demand function can be expressed as
D(t) =
Q∑
R=1
a
µ(t)
R H[SR(t)− r]
Q∑
R′=1
(1 + sgn [SR(t)− SR′(t)]) ΨR,R′ , (8)
where Ψ is the symmetrized strategy allocation matrix which constitutes the
quenched disorder present during the system’s evolution. The volume V (t) is
given by the same expression as D(t) replacing a
µ(t)
R by unity.
For the parameter ranges of interest, the choice about whether a strategy
is played by an agent is more determined by whether that strategy’s score is
above the threshold, than whether it is their highest-scoring strategy. This is be-
cause agents are only likely to have at most one strategy whose score lies above
the threshold for confidence levels r ≥ 0. Making the additional numerically-
justified approximation of small quenched disorder (i.e. the variance of the en-
tries in the strategy allocation matrix Ψ is smaller than their mean for the
17
Figure 9: Dynamical behaviour of complex system (e.g. price P (t) in financial
market) described by evolution of nodal weights cµ. History at each timestep
indicated by black square. Large change preceded by abnormally high nodal
weight. Large change incorporates fixed-node and cyclic node crashes.
parameter range of interest [15]), the demand and volume become
D(t) =
Q∑
R=1
a
µ(t)
R H[SR(t)− r]
Q∑
R′=1
N
Q2
=
N
Q
Q∑
R=1
a
µ(t)
R H [SR(t)− r]
=
N
Q
Q∑
R=1
a
µ(t)
R
1
2
(
1 + sgn [SR(t)− r]
)
=
N
2Q
Q∑
R=1
a
µ(t)
R sgn [SR(t)− r] , (9a)
V (t) =
N
Q
Q∑
R=1
H [SR(t)− r] =
N
2
+
N
2Q
Q∑
R=1
sgn [SR(t)− r] . (9b)
Let us suppose persistence on node µ = 0 starts at time t0. How long will the
resulting large change last? To answer this, we decompose (9a) into strategies
which predict option A at µ = 0, and those that predict B. We first consider
the particular case where the node µ = 0 was not visited during the previous T
timesteps, hence the loss of score increment from time-step t−T will not affect
S(t) on average. At any later time t0+ τ during the large change, (9a) and (9b)
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are given by
D(t0 + τ) = −
N
2Q


∑
R∋aµ
R
=−1
sgn [SR(t0)− r − τ ]−
∑
R∋aµ
R
=1
sgn [SR(t0)− r + τ ]

 ,(10)
V (t0 + τ) =
N
2
+
N
2Q


∑
R∋aµ
R
=−1
sgn [SR(t0)− r − τ ] +
∑
R∋aµ
R
=1
sgn [SR(t0)− r + τ ]

 .
The magnitude of the demand |D(t0 + τ)| decreases as the persistence time τ
increases, and the large change will end at time t0 + τc when the right-hand
side of (10) becomes zero. We denote the persistence time or ‘crash-length’ by
τc. It is easy to obtain an upper limit for the duration of a large change by
determining when the demand D changes sign. This occurs when the mean of
the scores of the strategies predicting A returns to 0, i.e.
τc = E
[
SR∋aµ
R
=−1(t0)
]
= −c0(t0)
from (7b). Thus the crash length will depend on the score difference between
strategies predicting option A and those predicting B. In the more general case,
where the node µ = 0 was visited during the previous T timesteps, τc is given
by the largest τ value which satisfies
τ = −

c0(t0) +∑
{t′}
sgn [D(t′)]

 (11)
where {t′} ∋ (µ(t′) = 0 ∩ t0 − T ≤ t
′ ≤ t0 − T + τ). The summation accounts
for any µ = 0 transitions in the period t0 − T to t0 − T + τ .
To obtain an improved estimate of τc, and investigate the behaviour of the
demand and volume, it is necessary to assume a distribution for the strategy
scores. In Figure 10 we plot an example of the strategy score distribution prior
to a large change. We assume that the scores have a near-Normal distribution,
i.e. SR∋aµ
R
=−1(t0) ∼ N[−c0(t0), σ] as shown Fig. 11.
5 Consequently, prior to a
large change, the score distribution tends to split into two halves. Substitution
into (10) gives the expected demand and volume during the crash:
D(t0 + τ) ∝ Φ
[
c0(t0)− r + τ
σ
]
− Φ
[
−c0(t0)− r − τ
σ
]
,
V (t0 + τ) ∝ Φ
[
c0(t0)− r + τ
σ
]
+Φ
[
−c0(t0)− r − τ
σ
]
.
These forms are illustrated in Figure 12. As the spread in the strategy score
distribution is increased, the dependence of D and V on the parameters τ and r
5At some points during the simulation the distribution can be more complex, e.g. multi-
modal behaviour.
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Figure 10: Empirical strategy score distribution. (b) is the strategy score dis-
tribution at timestep 760 from the series depicted in (a).
becomes weaker and the surfaces flatten out leading to a smoother drawdown,
as opposed to a sudden severe crash. In the limit σ → 0, the crash-length
τc = −c0(t0) − |r|. As the parameters c0, σ, r are varied, it can be seen that
the behaviour of the demand and volume during the large change can exhibit
markedly different qualitative forms.
4.3 Repeated occurence of large changes
We now turn to the important practical question of whether history will repeat
itself, i.e. given that a large change has recently happened, is it likely to happen
again? If so, is it likely to be even bigger? Suppose the system has built up a
negative nodal weight for µ = 0 at some point in the game (see Fig. 13a). It then
hits node µ = 0 at time t0 producing a large change (Fig. 13b). The nodal weight
c0 is hence restored to zero (Fig. 13c). In this model the previous build-up is
then forgotten because of the finite T score window, hence c0 becomes positive
(Fig. 13d). The system then corrects this imbalance (Fig. 13e), restoring c0 to
0. The large change is then forgotten, hence c0 becomes negative (Fig. 13f).
The system should therefore crash again - however, a crash will only re-appear
if the system’s trajectory subsequently returns to node µ = 0. Interestingly, we
find that the disorder in the initial distribution of strategies among agents (i.e.
the quenched disorder in Ψ) can play a deciding role in the issue of ‘births and
revivals’ of large changes since it leads to a slight bias in the outcome, and hence
the subsequent transition, at each node. In certain configurations, this system
may demonstrate repeated instabilities leading to large changes. When cµ(t) = 0
(see Fig. 13c), it follows that sgn[D(t)] is more likely to be equal to sgn
[
a
µ(t) · x
]
where xR =
∑
R′ ΨR,R′ is a strategy weight vector with xR corresponding to the
number of agents who hold strategy R [16]. The quenched disorder therefore
provides a crucial bias for determining the future trajectory on the de Bruijn
20
Figure 11: Schematic representation of strategy score distribution prior to crash.
Arrows indicate subsequent motion during crash period.
graph when the nodal weight is small, and hence can decide whether a given
large change recurs or simply disappears. The quenched disorder also provides
a catalyst for building up a very large change [16].
5 Concluding remarks
We have addressed the issue of understanding, predicting and eventually control-
ling catastrophic endogenous changes in a collective. By utilizing information
about the strategy weights within the model, we have developed a method for
determining when a large change is likely within a generic complex system, the
so-called GCBG, and obtained an analytic expression for its expected duration.
Our work opens up the study of how a ‘complex-systems-manager’ might use
this information to control the long-term evolution of a complex system by in-
troducing, or manipulating, such large changes [16]. As an example, we give a
quick three-step solution to prevent large changes: (1) use the past history of
outcomes to build up an estimate of the score vector S(t) and the nodal weights
{cµ(t)} on the various critical nodes, such as µ = 0 in the case of the fixed-node
crash. (2) Monitor these weights to check for any large build-up. (3) If such a
build-up occurs, step in to prevent the system hitting that node until the weights
have decreased. Finally we note that it can sometimes be beneficial to induce
small changes ahead of time, in order to avoid larger changes in the future. We
call this process ‘immunization’ and refer to Ref. [12] for more details.
We are grateful to David Wolpert, Kagan Tumer and Damien Challet for
many useful discussions about Collectives.
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Figure 12: Plots of expected demand D(t) and volume V (t) during crash period
showing range of different possible behaviour as system parameters are varied.
Figure 13: Representation of how large changes can recur due to finite memory
of agents. Grey area shows history period outside agents’ memory. Example
shows recurring fixed-node crash at node µ = 0.
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